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Brexistential angst and the paradoxes of populism: on the contingency, predictability and 
intelligibility of seismic shifts  
 
Colin Hay, CEE, Sciences Po, Paris  
colin.hay@sciencespo.fr  
 
Abstract. The time-travelling political scientist stepping out of her time machine today, having started 
her journey even five years earlier, would be amazed and, no doubt, shocked by the world in which 
she found herself.  What sense, if any, might she make of British politics after the vote for Brexit  W and, 
indeed, of the politics which gave rise to it?  And what does the answer to that question tell us about 
how the vote for Brexit happened, how it was allowed to happen, its wider implications (both political 
and economic), and the seismic changes in and through which British politics is currently being 
remade?  In an inevitably prospective and necessarily provisional way I seek to reflect on the paradoxes 
of populism and neoliberal globalism that Brexit reveals as a way of drawing out a few of its 
implications for the conduct of British political analysis in a world in which Brexit could happen yet was 
essentially unforeseen.   
 
 
The paradoxical contingency of Brexit 
 
To those who either think that a predictive science of politics is possible or, without having 
thought about it very much, proceed on the basis that it is, contemporary British politics 
presents something of a challenge.*  For who did  W and, credibly, who could have  W predicted 
Brexit, certainly the Brexit that Brexit will turn out to be?   
 
                                                 
* Earlier versions of at least parts of the argument developed here have been presented, at earlier 
stages in the making of Brexit, ŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ ůĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ Ăƚ ů ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚé de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III 
(November 2016), Sciences Po, Paris (December 2016), the Max Planck Institute for the Study of 
Society in Cologne (January 2017), the University of Sheffield (March 2017) ĂŶĚ ?ŵŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ?<ŝŶŐ ?Ɛ
College, London.  I am grateful to participants on each occasion for their probing comments and 
thoughtful suggestions, as I am to both the referees and editors of Political Studies.  The usual caveats 
apply with even more than the usual vigour. 
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But, however chastening in this respect at least it may be, it is hardly unique.  Much that was 
previously solid, or seen to be solid, in British politics has melted into air in recent years; much 
has changed and little of that change was foreseen.  Consider the time-travelling political 
analyst stepping out of her Tardis on the 24th of June 2016 having just delivered her account 
of the recent re-election of Margaret Thatcher at the 1984 Political Studies Association 
Conference.  Then, to remind you, Peter Davidson was Doctor Who; the guardians of the 
Special Relationship were Ronald Reagan and, of course, the newly re-elected Margaret 
Thatcher; the Cold War was at its height, the Berlin Wall had yet to fall, Gorbachev was on the 
verge of becoming General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the terms glasnost 
and perestroika were, as yet, entirely unfamiliar even to Western diplomats.  The European 
Union (EU) was still the European Economic Community (EEC), the debate on European 
Monetary Union would take a further five years to begin in earnest.  The Social Democratic 
Party had just split from Labour, the Liberal Democrats and UKIP had yet to be founded, and 
it was Labour and not the Conservatives who were divided over Europe.   
 
Still reeling from her chrononautia, there is much that she might find disconcerting.  That an 
anti-establishment party of the right that did not exist in 1984 (UKIP) would win nearly 13 per 
cent of the vote in the most recent General Election having won scarcely 3 per cent in the 
previous one (and, indeed, only 1.8 per cent in the next one).  That the Scottish National Party 
would win 56 out of the 59 available seats in Scotland ŝŶƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐĂŵĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĂƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
third party (the Liberal Democrats) would suffer the largest single drop in vote share (15 per 
cent) ever recorded in a post-war British General Election having been in a Coalition 
administration with the Conservatives until the election?  That a Conservative PM could have 
called a referendum on British membership of the EU and that Britain could vote for Brexit in 
such a referendum?   
 
But there is an irony here.  For one would not have had to travel forward in time three decades 
to find any of this shocking.  The brutal reality is that none of these outcomes would have 
seemed very likely and virtually none of them were predicted even five years before.  It need 
hardly be pointed out that the vote for Brexit has not exactly brought an end to this period of 
unpredicted and seemingly exceptional outcomes.  Who, after all, would have predicted that 
having expressly said she wouldn't and after the passing of the 2011 Fixed Term Parliaments 
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Act expressly intended to prevent such game playing, Theresa May would both gamble and 
have the opportunity to gamble her slender parliamentary majority at the polls in order to 
strengthen her Brexit-negotiating clout.  And who would have predicted that with an opinion 
poll lead of over 20 per cent at the start of the campaign and in an election in which Labour 
and the Conservatives achieved their highest combined vote share since 1970 (in an era 
generally considered to have seen the death of bipartisanship in Britain),1 she would lose her 
ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĞŶĚƵƉŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ?ŽĨĂůůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞhW ?zŽƵĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŵĂŬĞ
it up; and more to the point, no-one did.  
 
So, has something profound changed in the nature of British politics and, perhaps, politics 
more broadly?  Has our politics become more profoundly contingent and unpredictable than 
it has ever been?  That, I think, is a very good question to pose.  But, for me at least, the answer 
is no.  Exceptional outcomes are, in a way, unexceptional  W they are, in a sense, the very stuff 
of politics.  The capacity to produce exceptional outcomes in the sense of outcomes that we 
would have to be very lucky to predict and, hence, very foolish to think that we could predict, 
show that the process producing them is itself political.  But if exceptional outcomes are the 
very stuff of politics, then we need to be careful  W more precisely, rather more careful than 
we tend to be  W about what we think we know (and, above all, about what we think we can 
know) about that politics.   
 
It is with these questions that this paper is principally concerned.  Its argument proceeds in 
three stages.  In the first I consider the potential contribution of political science to our 
understanding of seismic shifts unfolding in real time, differentiating between the 
predictability and (retrospective) intelligibility of Brexit in the light of the necessary 
contingency of both Brexit and its consequences.  In the second I reflect on the making of the 
vote for Brexit itself, considering above all the role of turnout differentials (anticipated and 
unanticipated) and, indeed psephology itself, in the generation of the outcome.  In so doing I 
hope to tease out some implications about the public responsibility of political scientists for 
the expertise they project into the public debate.  In a third and final section I turn more 
prospectively to the implications of Brexit, seeking to identify a series of tensions and 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Webb (2016). 
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paradoxes already present in the vote whose resolution will determine which of the many 
possible Brexits Brexit turns out to be.    
 
 
Brexistential dilemmas 
 
The predictability and intelligibility of Brexit 
 
The parable of the time-travelling political analyst suggests the need to draw a clear distinction 
between predictability (the capacity to anticipate), on the one hand, and retrospective 
intelligibility (the capacity to make sense of something after the fact with already existing 
analytic resources), on the other.  Put bluntly, the capacity to anticipate a social fact is not a 
good (nor, indeed, a legitimate) test of social scientific theory; the capacity to render a social 
fact intelligible retrospectively is.  From such a perspective, the failure to predict that Brexit 
would happen is not, in and of itself, a theoretical failing in that Brexit is not knowable in 
advance of the crystallisation of the specific causal sequence bringing it to fruition.  But the 
incapacity to make sense of Brexit in causal terms after the fact of Brexit is a failing (the failure 
of a legitimate test or expectation).   
 
In this respect, the failure of political scientists and political economists to anticipate Brexit 
and/or to accord to it a low probability as an outcome is different in kind to the failure of 
mainstream economics to anticipate the global financial crisis (though cf. Blyth & Matthijs 
2017; Hopkin & Blyth 2018).  For in the latter case, the charge (at least) is that mainstream 
economics does not have the conceptual and analytic resources and capacity (based, as it is, 
on essentially equilibrium assumptions) to render intelligible the crisis it failed to anticipate 
and, more importantly.   
 
Whilst our time-travelling political analyst may lack the analytic resources required to make 
sense of what, to her, look like 21st century anomalies, the same is not really the case for her 
21st century peers.  For, arguably, each of the exceptional (and unforeseen) outcomes 
identified above can be rendered intelligible (and has now already been rendered intelligible) 
in terms of the (contingent) articulation, interaction and interplay of quite familiar processes 
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(some, indeed, familiar even to a political scientist who learned her trade in the 1960s and 
1970s).  Amongst such factors are the following: growing regional and geographical 
differentiation of political cultures in a more dis-United Kingdom; the Increasing presence of 
non-majoritarian electoral systems in the UK polity and the ability to carry success from one 
electoral system to another; the declining electoral appeal of valence politics; declining 
partisan alignment and identification; iŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůǀŽůĂƚŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ƚĂŝŶƚŽĨŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?; the 
declining electoral appeal of valence politics; growing divisions within the Conservative Party 
over Europe; the increasing use of referendums to resolve positional issues; growing anxieties 
about immigration and competition for jobs associated (rightly or wrongly) with EU 
enlargement and the free mobility of labour; and growing economic inequality in a context of 
austerity and persistently low growth.  If Brexit can be seen as a (potentially) seismic shift, 
then these are the fault-lines making it possible.   
 
The point is that one can go a long way to explaining each and every one of the seemingly 
exceptional political outcomes identified above, Brexit included, in terms of the interplay of a 
series of broader political trends already widely identified in the existing literature.  If this is 
ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŝƐŝŶĨĂĐƚĞǆƉůŝĐĂďůĞ at least retrospectively in more general terms, 
the impression of a new condition of radical contingency afflicting our polity and our politics 
may well be misleading and something of an illusion.  It may well also prove rather transitory.  
At times British politics has been quite predictable; at other times less so.  Today it would 
appear less so.  Yet this is not because it is, in some fundamental way, more profoundly 
contingent than it has ever been.  Rather, and more simply, it is that a variety of long-term 
processes and trends that political scientists would claim to understand quite well come 
together and interact to produce a conjuncture in which a great many major issues will be 
resolved together in an unusually short space of time.  In this conjuncture British politics will 
not just develop but potentially change decisively and with enduring consequences.  
 
,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇŽƌthe contingent inevitability of Brexit 
 
A second window on all of this is opened by an intuitively appealing if paradoxical aphorism 
of the late, great and much lamented historian Eric Hobsbawm.  It looks immediately like an 
antidote to the kind of argument that I have been making.  The line appears only once in his 
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published writings  W a characteristically provocative essay on the use of counterfactuals in the 
history of ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ post-war reconstruction (1993: 29).  But apparently he used it a great deal 
in the seminar room, which perhaps gives me the license to misquote it just a little.  It goes 
something like this P “ƚŚŝŶŐƐƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚĞǇĚŝĚ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁĂǇ
ƚŚĞǇĚŝĚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ ? ƐĞĞĂůƐŽHay 2002: 269).  Recast in the 
terms of the present discussion we get:  “the referendum on Brexit, the vote for Brexit and the 
Brexit to which it gave rise each turned out the way they did, and because they turned out the 
ǁĂǇ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŝĚ ƚŚĞǇ ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƚƵƌŶĞĚ ŽƵƚ ĂŶǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ǁĂǇ ? (on the contingency and 
inevitability of Brexit see also Thompson 2017; Wincott 2017).   
 
The quote itself, and the implicit challenge it poses, are unsettling (intentionally so).  But it is 
an altogether easier thing to trip from the lips of a historian (with the benefit of hindsight) 
than it is for a political analyst (who typically lacks such hindsight).  Either way, it challenges 
directly the preceding argument.  For it suggests that uncertainty is simply a problem of lack 
of knowledge  W and, consequently, that if we knew more we would be able to predict better.  
That sounds intuitively plausible.  But the clear implication is that prediction is both a 
legitimate and an epistemological test of a theory.  The outcome (the thing that turned out 
the way it did) ?ŝŶ,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?ƐƉĂƌĂďůĞ ?ŝƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ?ŝƚŝƐũƵƐƚŽƵƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨŝƚƚŚĂƚŝƐůĂĐŬŝŶŐ
(it is only uncertain to us ? ?  Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ŶŽ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ŝŶ ,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?Ɛ
ontological universe.  Uncertainty, for him, is a purely epistemological phenomenon  W 
epistemologically contingent not ontologically necessary.2  The problem, as one can almost 
hear him adding, is that we are simply never capable of acquiring the knowledge that would 
be required to know how things will turn out in advance of them turning out the way they 
were always going to turn out.  That, for him, I suppose is the paradox of (our) uncertainty; 
and it is certainly frustrating for the political analyst.  It is reminiscent of the meteorologist 
who, when asked for a weather forecast for 2020, responds that the causal sequence that will 
produce the weather in 2020 does not yet exist and that, as such, no prediction is currently 
possible.  The weather will be there to be predicted; just not yet! 
 
                                                 
2 This is, of course, to assume that the aphorism accurately encapsulates that ontological universe and 
was not just conjured for the benefit of the cut and thrust of the seminar room. 
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Whilst there is no ƉƌŽďůĞŵǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĞƚĞŽƌŽůŽŐŝƐƚ ?Ɛ ?ĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶƚ ?ƌĞƚŽƌƚ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
systems are different in kind from natural systems  W and the problem of certainty and 
uncertainty presents itself differently.  By contrast, Hobsbawm, I think is wrong.  His position, 
perhaps more significantly, is an indulgence that I think a political analyst cannot afford; for it 
is a profound disavowal of the political.  Politics is made; and at the moment of its making it 
is indeterminate.  As another, no less renowned ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?ŚĂƌůĞƐdŝůůǇƉƵƚƐŝƚ ? “ǁĞnow live 
ŝŶŽŶĞŽĨŵĂŶǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? P86).  From this perspective, there are always multiple 
possible outcomes.  That does not make all outcomes possible (alas) and it does not make the 
unlikely more likely (alas).  But it means that our future is always uncertain  W and uncertain 
ontologically (it could, and at the moment of its making, can be made differently) not (just) 
epistemologically (we do not know enough to know how it will turn out).   
 
That is neither good nor bad, though it is the very condition I would contend of things being 
political.  The implication is, again, that whilst we might hope to make sense of Brexit we 
ƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝƚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶturn, has (or should have) implications 
for what we might credibly say about the consequences of Brexit (a point to which we return 
presently).  
 
But there is a second problem, at least in the context of the present discussion ?ŽĨ,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?Ɛ
aphorism.  For the things we are interested in here (Brexit and its consequences) are still in 
play.  As such, they have yet to turn out the way they will.  And ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚǇĞƚƚƵƌŶĞĚ
out that way we remain in the dark as to the only way they could turn out.  This reminds us 
again of the difference between the historian (concerned largely with things already resolved) 
and political analysts (concerned, certainly to a far greater extent, with things still in play).  Yet 
the more one thinks about it the more problematic even this is.  For it is in fact rare for political 
analysts to be as heavily invested in processes that are still unfolding as they are with Brexit.  
We tend in fact to have more in common with the historians, typically sharing with them the 
comparative luxury of waiting for things to have turned out the way they will before we seek 
to make sense of them.  With Brexit the stakes are simply too high for that (certainly for 
analysts of British and EU politics and political economy); and that means that we need to 
think very seriously about what we can legitimately expect to know about something still very 
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much in the process of being made, the confidence with which we profess that knowledge 
and the appropriate caveats surrounding it.   
 
That takes us well beyond our typical comfort zone.  Yet if the value of the epistemological 
distinction that I have sought to draw between predictability and the rendering intelligible of 
things after the fact is accepted then it might provide some help and guidance here.  Above 
all it suggests that, if we cannot expect to be able to predict that which we accept to be 
political and (hence necessarily) contingent, the best we can do is to describe prospectively 
the field of outcomes that our current approach is capable of rendering intelligible 
retrospectively.  In addition, and by way of commentary, we might perhaps also offer a 
tentative assessment of the distribution of relative probabilities across this spectrum of 
conceivable outcomes.  But it is difficult to see how we can credibly do more.  In short, those 
who failed to predict Brexit (and even those lucky enough to do so) need to be careful before 
telling us what its consequences will turn out to be.   
 
dŽĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚ ?ŝƚŝƐƉĞƌŚĂƉƐǁŽƌƚŚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?ƐŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
test when applied directly to Brexit.  If our general and collective failure to predict Brexit was 
simply a reflection of our lack of knowledge, it is surely worth asking what would we have 
needed to know in order to predict that an EU referendum would take place in the way in 
which it did (and not in some other way) and that it would result in the vote for Brexit that it 
generated (and not some other vote for Brexit).   
 
Arguably, for things to turn out the way they did, many if not all of the following had to 
happen:3 
- Cameron needed to think that he could not win the 2015 General Election, certainly 
outright, such that he had little or nothing to lose in putting the commitment to a 
referendum on EU membership in the Conservative Party manifesto;4 
                                                 
3 WƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇǁŚŝĐŚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚĐŽŵďŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶŽŶĞ ?ƐƉƌĞĨerred account of the vote 
for Brexit after the fact. 
4 Or, alternatively, as in the account of Adam Tooze (2018: 545-8; see also Thompson 2017), that at 
the time of the Bloomberg speech in 2013, Cameron had to think that the threat of a referendum on 
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- The Conservatives needed to win, and to win outright5, and then to honour that 
manifesto pledge in office; 
- Cameron had to fail to secure significant concessions from EU negotiators prior to the 
referendum; 
- There needed to be two not just one leave campaign, extending the range of 
hypothetical (and mutually incompatible) Brexits ostensibly on offer (racist Brexit, 
ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƚƌĞǆŝƚ ? ‘ŐůŽďĂůƌŝƚŝƐŚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚĂŶĚƐŽĨŽƌƚŚ ?; 
- Boris Johnson needed to join the leave campaign (and, in order to do so, and however 
paradoxically, had to ũƵĚŐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚĐŽƵůĚŶ ?t win but would nonetheless command the 
majority support of the Conservative rank-and-file who might provide the decisive 
electoral momentum for any leadership challenge he were later to make); 
- dŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽƌĞƉĞĂƚƚŚĞĞƌƌŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂĚ
proved so disastrous in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Jeffery 2016); 
- dŚĞ  ‘ůĞĨƚ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ŽĨ ŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ĐŽŵĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ŬŶŽǁŶ ? ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ  ?ďĞ
persuaded to) put aside their pocketbooks and discount the potential economic 
consequences of the Brexit they were to vote in favour of for more clearly political 
reasons; 
- The pollsters needed to under-estimate the leave vote by disproportionately 
discounting the vote of the disaffected; 
- Many  ‘soft remainers ? needed to follow the pollsters ? lead and discount the likelihood 
of a vote for Brexit and stay at home; 
                                                 
EU membership would prompt the EU into a significant reform of its founding treaties sufficient to 
ƌĞƐŽůǀĞ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ? ůŽŶŐ ƚĞƌŵ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ŝŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ  ?ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ŽďǀŝĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
referendum ever to be held).  The issue is, of course, a complex and intriguing one which cannot be 
adjudicated here.  What is clear is that, as Tooze and Thompson both make clear, the dispositional 
divide between London, on the one hand, and Brussels and Frankfurt, on the other, on the regulation 
of financial service provision in the wake of the global financial crisis was an important factor (see also 
Hay & Bailey 2019).  
5 Or, indeed, to govern in coalition with UKIP  W but that would not have been for things to turn out the 
way they did.  Things turned out the way they did and this is not how they turned out, so they couldn't 
ŚĂǀĞƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝŶƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐŽĨ,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?ƐĂƉŚŽƌŝƐŵ ? 
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- Young remainers, in particular, needed to turnout in lower numbers than their more 
Brexit-inclined parents and grandparents;  
- Corbyn needed to become leader of the Labour Party and, in order for that to happen, 
moderate and right-wing anti-Corbyn Labour MPs needed (paradoxically) to conspire 
to vote for him in the first round of the leadership contest so that he might make it 
onto the ballot; and 
- Even before that, Ed Miliband needed to have reformed the electoral college of the 
>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇƐŽƚŚĂƚŝƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚďǇŽƌďǇŶ ?ƐƌĂŶŬ-and-file support base. 
 
Arguably, that just about gets us from the General Election Campaign of 2015 to the outcome 
of the Brexit vote itself; to get us from there to where we are today, we need to add a few 
more similarly contingent factors: 
 
- Theresa May had to seek to extend her majority in 2016, ostensibly to improve her 
bargaining position and Brexit mandate vis-à-vis the EU negotiators; 
- And she had to fail to do so so catastrophically that she would end up reliant on the 
grace and favour  ?Žƌ ‘ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐƵƉƉůǇ ? ?of the DUP for a parliamentary majority 
in such a way as to make the Irish border  ?ĂŶĚ ? ŝŶ ĚƵĞ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ďĂĐŬƐƚŽƉ ? ?a 
potential breaking point in the Brexit negotiations (Tonge 2017); 
- The Brexiteers had to seek to give Parliament the final say on any Brexit deal, despite 
the absence of a clear Parliamentary majority for the Brexit they sought (and certainly 
for any one of the various options proposed for it); 
- May had to yield to these self same Brexiteers in committing herself to a parliamentary 
vote on the Brexit deal that she was seeking to negotiate despite the fact that it was 
difficult (either then or subsequently) to envisage any kind of Brexit deal capable of 
winning a parliamentary majority; 
- May had to survive, within the same two-week period, a vote of no confidence within 
her own party, the biggest defeat of an incumbent administration in a parliamentary 
vote in the democratic era and a vote of no confidence in her government, yet decide 
to continue in office as Prime Minister until Brexit had been implemented; 
- The majority of Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid and Green MPs needed to think 
that by voting against the deal it would be possible to secure either no Brexit or less 
 11 
Brexit whilst a majority of Conservative MPs thought that rejecting the deal would 
provide either a no-deal Brexit or the prospect of an as yet harder Brexit (in short, that 
a vote to reject the deal would have the mirror opposite effect); 
- John Bercow, the Speaker of the House of Commons, had to decide to ignore the 
advice of the Commons Clerk and all historical precedent in ruling that a (mere) 
backbencher could table an amendment to a Business of the House motion put 
forward by the government, with the effect that the House of Commons was offered 
a vote requiring the Government to present a revised Brexit plan within three days of 
any defeat to the proposed Brexit deal.  
 
Put together, this is already quite a list.  Clearly some of these factors are the product of short-
term, almost whimsical, decisions and may well turn out to be of little or no long-term 
ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĞƌĐŽǁ ?ƐĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂĨĨŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĞ^ƉĞĂŬĞƌŽĨƚŚĞ
House of Commons, for instance).  But the point is that we simply do not know what will turn 
out to be significant in advance.6  Brexit has been made through the dynamic interplay 
between the highly contingent and sometimes prosaic on the one hand and the rather more 
predictable and seemingly significant on the other.  Knowledge of the latter can only get us so 
far.  And in terms of the compound contingencies of the Brexit process to date, this is arguably 
just the tip of the proverbial iceberg  W not least since it makes no reference at all to the 
negotiating stance of the EU27.  But the point is surely made already.  Whilst some of these 
contingencies were clearly more predictable than others, it is difficult even to render 
intelligible, let alone to have predicted in advance, how things turned out the way they did.  
                                                 
6 With the benefit of the additional hindsight afforded by the passage of time since this was written, 
you (the reader) are better placed than I to sift the list for the ephemeral and irrelevant, on the one 
hand, and the no-less ephemeral yet enduringly significant, on the other.  That the ephemeral might 
turn out to prove significant is the ontological precondition of our epistemological uncertainty; and 
that is the point.  It is by no ŵĞĂŶƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚŽƌĞǆŝƚ ?ũƵƐƚĂƐŝƚŝƐďǇŶŽƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚŽĞƌĐŽǁ ?ƐŵĂĐŚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ
as the Speaker of the House in the making of Brexit.  
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To do so would, in effect, be the equivalent of having placed the largest successful one-way 
accumulator bet in history.7   
 
The preceding discussion is intended to be chastening.  My aim has been to remind us of, and 
to focus in on the reasons for, the inherent difficulty of seeking to make sense of unfolding 
processes of potentially seismic change in real time.  As I have sought to suggest, and strange 
though it may seem, this is not something that we do frequently and it is, arguably, something 
for which modern political science does not prepare us especially well.  But that is most 
definitely not an argument for foregoing such a task.  It is an argument for thinking seriously 
about our responsibilities as ostensible experts (purveyors of an expertise to others) in a 
context in which the use and misuse of that expertise is both highly contested and, crucially, 
stands accused by those on one side of a highly charged and polarised political debate of a 
disingenuous and misleading neutrality that disguises an essentially normative commitment 
to the status quo.   
 
This is, perhaps, the curse of living and writing in Br-exiting times!  It is also a challenge.  In 
what follows I return first to the making of Brexit and then to the potentially paradoxical 
character of the Brexit that Britain8 is still in the process of making in the light of my own 
cautionary remarks.  In so doing I seek to address the challenge directly, by exploring how 
such cautionary reflections might lead me (and conceivably others) to revise or temper what 
I (and they) might otherwise be inclined to inject into the public debate.   
 
The making of the vote for Brexit  
 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐǀŽƚĞĨŽƌƌĞǆŝƚŽŶƚŚĞ ? ?rd of June 2016 represents an exceptional, unprecedented, 
singular and, it is certainly tempting to suggest, an irreversible choice.  But the preceding 
analysis suggests the need for caution even here.  Of these four descriptive adjectives, 
                                                 
7 If only to find that the currency in which the bet was placed crash on international exchanges the 
second the final horse crossed the finish line! 
8 In and through a simultaneously unilateral (if internally fragmented) and yet bilateral (and ostensibly 
diplomatic) process. 
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 ‘ŝƌƌĞǀĞƌƐŝďůĞ ? ŝƐ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?  &Žƌ ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ Ɛƚŝůů ũƵƐƚ ĂďŽƵƚ
possible to imagine the process initiated by the vote for Brexit ending in a second referendum 
and, as such, that Brexit might never take place.9  It is also possible  W indeed, perhaps more 
credible  W to imagine some longer-ƚĞƌŵƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨďƵǇĞƌ ?ƐƌĞŵŽƌƐĞ ?ĨƵĞůůĞĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐďǇƚŚĞ
economic consequences of actually existing Brexit) leading to a revisiting of ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
relationship with the EU and a referendum on  ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ? ? ‘ƌĞŶƚƌǇ ? or, perhaps best of all,  ‘ƌĞ-
ĞŶƚƌǇ ?.    
 
What is clearer is that the choice for Brexit arose from a referendum on an issue of consistently 
low electoral salience  W even in the 2015 General Election (with the Conservative ?Ɛŵanifesto 
containing ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?Ɛ referendum pledge) it was ranked the 11th most salient issue shaping 
personal voting intentions according to YouGov.  Yet, whatever its salience to voters, it is likely 
to have amazingly high domestic and international political and economic implications  W not 
least since it interacts significantly with many issues of much higher salience (like immigration 
and economic performance).  It produced a result that, in effect, the entire Westminster 
political establishment had campaigned (more or less enthusiastically) against, aided  W or, at 
least, that was presumably their intention  W by the IMF, the OECD and a variety of world 
leaders, including President Obama himself.  The unanticipated result shocked the political 
establishment including, of course, many prominent Brexiteers.  The irony, of course, is that 
one suspects that Boris :ŽŚŶƐŽŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƌĞǆŝƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝƚĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚǁŝŶǁŚŝůƐƚ
Theresa May supported remain becausĞƐŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝƚĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚůŽƐĞ.  Either way, the result 
cruelly exposed, and not for the first time, the methodological challenges of polling in an age 
of widespread and growing political disaffection (especially where disaffection is itself a 
variable corƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇǁŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ stance on the issue at stake).   
 
For political analysts, the vote for Brexit is a fascinating and important event  W rich in its 
potential to furnish a series of more generalizable inferences  ?ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇďĞŝŶŐ ? ‘ŽĨ
ǁŚĂƚŝƐƌĞǆŝƚĂŶŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ? ?; and, for political elites around the world, a frightening episode 
                                                 
9 This is certainly not to imply that a second referendum would in any sense lead naturally to a reversal 
of Brexit  W but simply to suggest that it could.   
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no less rich in its potential lessons and warnings  W and with a series of alarming parallels (the 
election of Donald Trump perhaps being the most obvious and the most widely debated).   
 
Although the result is, of course, well known, and has now been exposed to the most forensic 
and sustained analysis, it is nonetheless important to remind ourselves of a few features of it, 
on which I will rely later, before we proceed further.  As we know, 51.9% voted leave on a 
72.2% turnout (interestingly, turnout in the 1975 EEC membership referendum was a mere 
64%).  As such, the vote for leave in 2016 represents the largest vote for anything in UK 
electoral history (with 17.4 million votes for leave against 16.1 million votes for remain).10  Yet, 
crucially, only two of the four constituent nations of the UK voted for leave (with 53.4% and 
52.5% of the vote being for leave in England and Wales, respectively, whilst 62% and 55.8% 
voted for remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively, on rather lower turnouts).  
There was majority support for remain in all local authority areas in Scotland, whilst 241 of 
the 293 English local authority areas outside of London voted for leave.  Support for leave has 
now been shown to correlate strongly (whether using individual or district-level data) with: 
low educational attainment; low income; age; recent increases in (but not aggregate levels of) 
in-migration; anti-migrant sentiment; political disaffection; prior UKIP and Conservative 
support; national (as opposed to European or British) identification; and, perhaps more 
surprisingly, low (not high) self-reported internet and smartphone usage (see Alabrese, 
Becker, Fetzer & Novy 2018; Clarke, Goodwin & Whiteley 2017; Goodwin & Milazzo 2017; 
Hobolt 2016).  Finally, and in part through these various analyses, the vote for leave has come 
to be wŝĚĞůǇĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚĂƐĂǀŽƚĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞ ‘ůĞĨƚďĞŚŝŶĚ ?ďǇŐůobalisation (Goodwin & Milazzo 
2017; Hopkin 2017; see also Ford & Goodwin 2014).  
 
So why did Brexit succeed?   
 
Why did British citizens vote to leave the EU, albeit by a narrow margin, on 23rd June 2016?  
Four factors, I will suggest, are crucial, though really only one of them has been extensively 
discussed in the wider literature on the subject to date, which has tended to focus on the 
                                                 
10 Interestingly, the vote for remain in 1975 was the second largest vote for anything in UK electoral 
history, narrowly squeezing into third place the vote for remain in 2016. 
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psephological variables and the composition of the vote rather than the context in which the 
vote took place (though see the various contributions to British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations volume 19 (3/4), 2017; Diamond et al. 2018; and Jennings & Lodge 
2018).  They are: (i) ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ  Wsimilar in certain respects to that of 
Harold Wilson in 1975, but playing out very differently in a very different political context; (ii) 
differential turnout between potential leave and potential remain supporters (associated, in 
turn, with the differential mobilisation of those for whom the issue was a valence question as 
against those for whom it was a positional question, with turnout significantly higher in the 
later category); (iii) the combination of political disaffection and socio-economic dislocation  W 
with strong support for Brexit amongst those feeling displaced by globalisation, by labour-
market precarity and the perception that such precarity was a product of high levels of in-
migration (significantly from East European accession states after 2004); and (iv) the failure of 
the political establishment to convince the electorate of the (singularly malign, in its terms) 
economic consequences of Brexit  W and the wider failure of a valence politics of what might 
be termed  ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?.
 
Each factor is worth exploring in a little more detail.   
 
ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůďƌŝŶŬŵĂŶƐŚŝƉ 
 
dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŝƐĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŶŐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌĂůůĞůƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚŽĨ,ĂƌŽůĚ
Wilson in 1975 (on which, see Butler & Kitzinger 1976; Daddow 2016; King 1977).  It is difficult 
to think of a more disastrous piece of political brinkmanship by any British Prime Minister 
 ?ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ^ ƵĞǌƌŝƐŝƐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂŶĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƉƵƚƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ
the question of continued EU membership and the politics leading up to that decision (see 
also Tooze 2018: 545-8).   
 
To be fair to him, the commitment to such a referendum in the Conservative manifesto for 
the 2015 General Election was made at a time when it seemed exceptionally unlikely that it 
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would need to be honoured (though, for a different view, see Thompson 2017: 444).11  Whilst 
it was not unthinkable that the Conservatives might emerge as the largest single party after 
ƚŚĞ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ĨĞǁ ŝĨ ĂŶǇ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ŶŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ
Conservatives governing alone after 2015.  Moreover, of potential coalition partners it was 
only UKIP who would be likely to accept a referendum as part of any coalition governing 
agenda (and they were likely to make the chance to vote for Brexit a condition of any coalition 
agreement anyway).  As such, the referendum pledge might well have seemed at the time a 
costless gesture. 
 
It is just about possible, then, to see the Brexit referendum to which Cameron felt he had 
committed himself in the manifesto, as an unintended (and even slightly embarrassing) 
consequence of his own success at the polls  W and, in particular, his success is obliterating his 
former coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, in an election he had never expected to win.   
 
But the more important point is that a Brexit referendum would have been unthinkable, even 
to Cameron, in the absence of the lingering internecine warfare in his own party over the 
question of Europe.  In the 1970s it was Labour that was divided over Europe (leading to the 
 ? ? ? ?ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵŝĚ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƐŝŶĐĞdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƌƵŐĞƐ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
and Black Wednesday (1992) it was the Tories.  The point is that the only conceivable question 
to which a Brexit referendum was the answer was one that started and finished with 
Conservative Party unity.  The positing and eventual calling of a ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛh
membership was only ever a strategy for managing internal party discipline.  
 
In a way Cameron gambled what he regarded to be ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛeconomic future on an always 
rather tenuous strategy for re-uniting his party  W and one that failed so spectacularly that it 
                                                 
11 dŚŽŵƉƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝƐƚŚĂƚĂŵĞƌŽŶĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞĚ ?ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞhŽĨĂƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ
ŽŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƚŚĞh ?ƐĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚƌĞĂƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďle regulatory environment for the City of 
London.  This is certainly true  W as the Bloomberg speech of January 2013, in which the threat was first 
articulated publicly, makes clear.  But, by 2015, this strategy had failed utterly and completely (see 
also Tooze 2018: 546).  
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ended up costing him his own job and which still threatens to split the party today.  Yet in so 
doing he was arguably not entirely unlike Harold Wilson in 1975 (see also Saunders 2016).  But 
what Wilson got right, Cameron got catastrophically wrong  W in large part because of the 
rather different political context in which their respective forms of brinkmanship were played 
out.   
 
Wilson, too, was something of a reluctant European.  He had argued passionately against 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽpean Economic Community (EEC) in 1972.  Yet, by 1975 he 
was  ?ŝŶƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐƉĂƌůĂŶĐĞ ? ĂƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ ‘ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞƌ ? ?ƵŶŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ?ĨŽƌŚŝŵ ?ŶĂƵƐĞĂƚŝŶŐůǇ
integrĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚ ƚĞŶŽƌŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ  ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ?ďƵƚ ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚ ŝŶĂ ƌĂƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞƉƌŽƐĂŝĐĂŶĚ
practical way of the economic advantages of continued membership.  Thus, when it came to 
ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ĨŽƌ ŚŝƐ ŽǁŶ  ‘ŝŶ ?ŽƵƚ ? ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵ ŽŶ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ  ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ Śe 
picked, as negotiating points, substantive issues on which he was likely to gain significant 
concessions (unlike Cameron), he secured essentially all the concessions that he sought during 
the renegotiation (unlike Cameron), he refused to campaign actively for the remain he tacitly 
embraced whilst making it very clear that his position was one of simple pragmatism (unlike 
Cameron) and he was positively surprised by the result, a significant majority in his favour in 
each region of the UK (most unlike Cameron).   
 
It could be argued that Wilson was lucky  W he, too, gambled what he also regarded to be 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĨĂƚĞŽŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƵƚŚĞĚŝĚƐŽŝŶĂĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ
economic paternalism (the expert adjudication of what was presented as a narrowly economic 
issue) was significantly more likely to pay off.  What is striking today is quite how difficult it is 
for political elites to make the case to citizens for something being in their shared or collective 
interest (Hay 2007).  In British politics, at least, it seems that the electorate is no longer 
capable of believing that something is in their interests if it is not directly opposed to the 
interests of someone else.  The campaigners for Brexit seemed to understand that intuitively, 
and certainly far better than their Remain counterparts, with Michael Gove in particular 
seeking at times almost to turn the vote for leave into a rejection of the political appeal to 
dispassionate expertise  W to considerable effect. 
 
Turnout and turnout differentials 
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The second factor to which I would draw attention is that of turnout differentials  W which, 
strangely, are hardly debated at all in the existing literature on Brexit (though for a rare 
exception see Clarke et al. 2017: 208-11).  It is almost certainly not the case that a majority of 
voting age British citizens supported Brexit on 23rd June 2016.  For, as ever, there were 
significant differences between the preferences of eligible potential voters, on the one hand, 
and the preferences of those of the electorate who were both registered to vote and who 
chose to vote on the other.  This is not, in any way, to question the democratic legitimacy of 
the outcome  W turnout was, of course, high and the furnishing of a democratic mandate has 
never relied upon 100 per cent participation.  So Brexit was the democratically legitimate 
outcome of the referendum.  As such, it is difficult to argue that it should not now be honoured 
(whatever one might think of the potential economic consequences). 
 
But it is nonetheless instructive to reflect on the fact that the vote for Brexit was the product 
of significant turnout differentials between potential  ‘ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů  ‘ƌĞǆŝƚĞĞƌƐ ? ?
What is now clear is that, had there been an 100 per cent turnout, Britain would have voted 
for remain and would probably have voted clearly for remain.  Perhaps more significantly, had 
remain-minded and leave-minded voters turned out at a common and rather more credible 
70 per cent the result would almost certainly have been different.  The point is that predictable 
differences in turnout made Brexit always more likely than the polls suggested (for precisely 
such a  ‘ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƐĞĞHay 2016).   
 
There are, in fact, a number of differential turnout effects at work in the Brexit result.  
Amongst these, three are familiar, well-established and relatively widely discussed.  They are: 
(i) age cohort effects  W the propensity for the elderly to turnout at much higher rates than the 
young and disproportionately to vote for leave (Franklin 2004; Hay 2007: 49-54); (ii) national 
variations in turnout levels, with participation rates in remain-supporting Scotland (67%) and 
Northern Ireland (63%) being significantly lower than those in leave-supporting England (73%) 
and Wales (72%) (and with turnout typically lowest in areas where there was either little or 
ŶŽĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶĨŽƌ  ‘ůĞĂǀĞ ? ?ĂƐ ŝŶŵƵĐŚŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ŽƌǁŚĞƌĞĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞƐǁĞƌĞĂĐĐƵƐƚŽŵĞĚƚŽ
having little or no impact on the result of UK-wide elections); and (iii) a London (and more 
general metropolitan) effect  W with turnout both low in London and lowest in those areas of 
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London in which support for remain was strongest (typically areas characterised by high levels 
of both migration and poverty).  The only significant factor pushing in the other direction was 
education  W which was strongly correlated with both turnout and with support for remain 
(see, for instance, Alabrese et al. 2018: Table A.2).   
 
These factors are all well-known and well-documented.  But arguably there is a fifth, that 
although largely absent from the debate is arguably at least as important.  It is the difference 
in engagement, mobilisation and, ultimately, turnout between those for whom the question 
of Brexit was a valence issue (a question of determining the shared collective good of the 
community) and those for whom it was a positional question (a simple question of political 
preference).  From the perspective of the remain campaign, the question of continued 
membership of the EU was a valence issue.  Brexit was simply bad for all.  The question was, 
in effect, a technical and largely economic matter to be determined through the use of 
appropriate expertise.  In stark contrast, for both the official and unofficial leave campaigns, 
Brexit was a positional issue  W a question of politics not of economics, a question of values, 
personal conviction and identity which simply couldn't be reduced to a set of technical 
considerations that might be adjudicated through the use of appropriate expertise (or even 
sub-contracted to the experts).   
 
In drawing attention to this distinction, my aim is not to pass a judgement on the political 
merits or otherwise ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ?ƐǀĂůĞŶĐĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĂů ŽĨƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
EU membership.  It is not difficult to understand why a more emotional and more political 
ĂƉƉĞĂůǁĂƐƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨĂĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ĞǆƉĞƌƚƉĂƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂƐ/ƐŚĂůůĐĂůůŝƚ ?Instead my 
aim is to point to one of the potential consequences of that choice  W namely, a lower capacity 
to mobilise voters, especially ŝŶĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞ ?ƐŽƉƉŽŶĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞĞŶŐĂŐĞĚŝŶĂǀĞƌǇ
different style of (positional) politics.  The valence politics of remain was always likely to leave 
more of its natural support at home than the positional politics of Brexit, particularly with 
many voters discounting the possibility that leave could win.  In terms of turnout, positional 
politics trumps valence politics every time.   
 
Bringing these factors together may well make Brexit seem almost inevitable, at least with the 
benefit of hindsight (and not just in the Hobsbawmian sense that since things turned out the 
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ǁĂǇƚŚĞǇĚŝĚƚŚĞǇĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƉŽƐƐŝďůǇŚĂǀĞƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌǁĂǇ ?.  But that is the wrong 
inference to draw here ?dŚĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞǆŝƚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶ ‘ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽƵƚŝƚƐǀŽƚĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
be underestimated  W and there are lessons to learnt from this.  Whilst we should not 
exaggerate the extent to which the vote for Brexit was a product of political disaffection and 
economic alienation (the majority of those who voted for Brexit were, after all, typical and 
habitual Conservative voters), we should not underestimate the capacity of the Brexit 
campaign (official, unofficial and in combination) to mobilise those typically characterised in 
the literature on political disengagement and disaffection as apathetic non-voters.  The Brexit 
vote gave many of them a voice.  Arguably this is its most remarkable feature.   
 
This leads to a final observation about turnout and expertise, albeit expertise of a rather 
different kind  W the expertise of the pollster.  It is credible, I think, to suggest that the pollsters 
played quite a significant, if inadvertent, role in the making of the vote for Brexit.  Throughout 
the campaign, it is now clear, they systematically underestimated the likely size of the leave 
vote.  In large part they did so because they underestimated the capacity of the leave 
campaign to mobilise the serially disaffected and those serially accustomed not to vote.  There 
is nothing terribly surprising about that failure, especially given the methodological difficulties 
inherent in seeking to construct a vote projection from polling data for a one-off referendum 
of this kind (in which all sorts of potentially problematic turnout estimations need to be made).   
 
But three points of some significance nonetheless follow from this.  First, getting it wrong in 
this way may well have contributed to keeping portions of the remain vote at home in that it 
encouraged them to think that they did not need to vote in order for Britain to remain an EU 
member state.  Second, and conversely, it may well have contributed to boosting the vote for 
leave, by making it easier to think of this as a relatively costless and largely symbolic protest 
against the political establishment (both domestic and European).   
 
The third implication is of a rather different kind.  When the pollsters came to re-assess their 
methodologies in the light of their (perceived) failure to have anticipated the vote for Brexit 
 ?ĂŶĚ ? ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ? ĂŵĞƌŽŶ ?Ɛ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ DĂǇ ?Ɛ ǀĂŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞŝƌ
conclusion was that they had actually done rather well (see, for instance, Sturgis et al. 2016).  
ůĞĐƚŽƌĂůŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĂƌĞŶ ?ƚĞĂƐǇƚŽƉƌĞĚŝĐƚ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶ times characterised by high electoral 
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volatility, referendums pose even greater challenges and, crucially, their predictions for the 
2015 and 2017 General Elections and the EU referendum, though wrong in the rather obvious 
sense that they failed to anticipate the result, all fell within the declared margin of error.  The 
implication of the preceding discussion is that such a conclusion is simply not good enough.   
 
The question is not whether the pollsters did the best job they could have done 
methodologically.  It it credible to think that they did.  Their failure was not methodological 
but presentational.  If polling is inherently tricky, polling in referendums doubly so, then the 
caveats need to come first and in a rather larger font size.  The responsibilities of the political 
analyst (pollsters included) demand a sharing of the methodological limits of the analysis with 
those for whom it is intended from the outset.  They also demand a much greater sense of 
responsibility for how the expertise provided is and might be used and misused.  It is simply 
not sufficient to say that the science was good and that the result fell within the margin of 
error if most of those who consulted the poll were not even aware that there was a margin of 
error.   
 
That brings us to the third and fourth set of factors, which it makes sense to discuss together.   
 
Brexit and the politics of expertise 
 
Brexit represents the failure of a certain style of politics and the triumph of another.  That 
triumph might well prove temporary, but it is certainly credible to think that it might endure.  
Above all, Brexit represents a rejection of the politics of expertise, at least in its current form, 
and of expert paternalism in particular.  Arguably the zenith of this expert paternalism was 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐŐŽŽĚĨŽƌǇŽƵďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞƚĞůůǇŽƵƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶďŽƚŚƚŚĞ
Scottish Independence and EU referendums.   
 
In stylised terms the rise and demise of expert paternalism might be seen to have passed 
through three stages.   
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In the 1960s and 1970s political elites were themselves trusted to deploy appropriate 
expertise, and the growth in the expertise available to them led to a confidence in their ability 
to govern (paternalistically) in the collective good.  
 
By the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the Anglo-liberal democracies, political elites were 
typically no longer trusted to deploy expertise themselves.  Such expertise needed to be 
depoliticised and placed at one remove from them (Burnham 2001).  Only experts, in this 
conception, could genuinely discern the collective good  W and could only do so if their 
expertise were protected and insulated from political influence.  The result was a politics of 
 ‘expertocracy ? and depoliticisation, in which positional issues were recast as valence issues 
and placed in the hands of (nominally) independent experts  W central bankers and the like.   
 
Brexit rejects that.  Its mantra  W  ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐďĂĐŬĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? W is not just about taking back control 
from Brussels, but taking back control of politics from experts too (and perhaps also taking 
back control of politics from those political elites who would seek to cede it to experts).  In a 
sense, there is little point and hence little to be gained by taking back control from Brussels if 
that control is simply to be passed domestically from the elected representatives of the people 
to their favoured purveyors of expertise.  The implied re-politicisation of the domestic polity 
could take, and might still take, a variety of forms.  But, for now, it is predictably the right, and 
the populist right at that, that has shown itself most at home with, and most deft in deploying, 
this new vernacular.  It is populist; it is nationalist; it is dis-integrationist; it is anti-
internationalist; it is, as Albert Weale (2016) puts it, nostalgically democratic  W and it has the 
capacity to recast British domestic politics and, in the process, its political economic 
interdependence.   
 
It also has potentially profound implications for political scientists as, at least potential, 
purveyors of expertise, in a context in which ƐƵĐŚĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ ‘ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?Žƌ ‘ƉƵďůŝĐůǇ
ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ? is an ever more highly incentivised marker of professional standing and 
achievement.  Here is not perhaps the place to pursue these issues in the detail their 
significance warrants.  Suffice it to note that if there is to be an, arguably long overdue, 
recalibration of the relationship between the suppliers of expertise and the exercise of 
democratic governance, then we will need to think long and hard about the responsibilities 
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that come with the provision of such expertise.  Four points immediately present themselves.  
First, even the genuine, neutral and dispassionate provision of a non-normative scientific 
knowledge (ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞƉŽůůƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƉƐĞƉŚŽůŽŐǇ ?can have a significant partisan effect, as in the 
potential contribution to the making of the vote for Brexit played by polling data in the 
preceding discussion.  Second, and rather more generally, the use by political elites of 
expertise as a mechanism of governance has served to mask, obfuscate, depoliticise and, 
arguably, de-democratise decision-making processes, not least by turning positional issues 
and questions ( ‘who benefits and who suffers from an interest rate rise ?) into valence issues 
and questions ( ‘what is the optimal interest rate setting for an economy such as ours at a 
moment like this ?).  Third, any attempt to define more clearly the responsibilities of the 
expert needs surely to insist on a much more sharply drawn distinction between the expertise 
itself and the use made of that expertise by decision-makers if the democratic accountability 
of the decision-making process is to be maintained.  And, fourth, a much greater emphasis 
needs to be placed on communicating the limits to the expertise provided (the margin of error 
and the methodological reasons for it are just as important as the most probable predicted 
outcome).    
 
Brexit and the paradoxes of neoliberal globalism 
 
In the concluding section of this paper I turn to some more prospective considerations, in 
briefly identifying some of the potential contradictions, tensions and paradoxes of Brexit, 
particularly in terms of its political economic implications.  These paradoxes arise in part from 
the fact that Brexit still remains to be made (and, as a consequence, might still turn out very 
differently) and in part from the fact that the aspirations for Brexit of those who voted for it 
(and, indeed, those who campaigned for it) are so diverse and contradictory.  The vote for 
Brexit was not, and never could be, a vote for a particular Brexit; it was a vote for as many 
different Brexits as it was possible to imagine wishing to vote for.  How those multiple 
imagined Brexits become one substantive Brexit is a process which can scarcely fail to 
disappoint many, if not most, of those who voted for it.   
 
The first paradox is that Brexit (and, above all, the anti-migration sentiment with which is has 
retrospectively come to be associated) has become, in effect, the political imperative to trump 
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all economic imperatives. Yet, at the same time, it will almost certainly turn out to be a 
medium- to long-term mechanism for ratcheting up such economic imperatives and the 
disciplinary logic they tend to impose (see also Baker & Lavery 2018; Gamble 2018, 2019; 
Lavery 2019; Rosamond 2019).  After almost three decades in which the British polity has 
danced to the tune of competitiveness, labour market flexibility, price stability and austerity 
in such a way as to place them, and any policy associated with their attainment, above political 
debate and contestation, Brexit looks like a staggering reversal.  For, albeit only in honouring 
a referendum verdict that it campaigned against, the British government has chosen to 
prioritise above all else the implementation of the staunchly anti-immigrationist sentiment 
that it interprets the vote for Brexit to be, regardless of any economic harm it might cause.   
 
What is perhaps most striking about Brexit, then, is that we see a British government, arguably 
for the first time in recent political history, taking what it clearly regards to be a phenomenally 
significant political and economic choice without regard for its own economic assessment  W 
indeed, in open violation of the advice of its own Treasury and, more recently, the Bank of 
England.  So much, one might think, for governance by perceived economic imperatives; so 
much for normalised neoliberalism.  So much for TINA; it turns out that there was an 
alternative after all.   
 
On the one hand, then, Brexit might be seen as the end of three decades of depoliticisation  W 
a ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ  ‘ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ďĂĐŬ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? ŽĨ ƚŚŝŶŐƐ (arguably like migration policy) 
previously subject to a dull logic of economic expediency.  Yet, on the other hand, and perhaps 
more credibly, it might be seen as a highly politicised but temporary moment in the transition 
to the next phase of depoliticisation.  In this conception, the process of economic adjustment 
to the yet harsher competitive conditions of the post-Brexit scenario can only serve to ratchet 
up several notches a logic of compulsion in which economic imperatives trump, as never 
before, political choices.  In a sense, it is both; and, as such, it reminds us of the potential 
fragility of the institutionalised depoliticisation of economic governance that we often 
associate with neoliberalism, particularly in the face of a newly resurgent populism. 
 
In a similarly paradoxical vein, Brexit might also be seen either to herald the return of 
protectionism (and certainly to arise from the expression of a protectionist reflex) after four 
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decades in which the mantras of liberalisation have predominated (Hopkin 2017).  Or, 
conversely, it might be seen to signal the rise of a more purist neoliberalism  W neoliberal 
globalism in one country, as it were.  Here it might be remembered that, for Michael Gove, 
Boris Johnson and the official Brexit campaign, the problem with the EU (to which Brexit was 
the solution) was a problem conceived largely (if not explicitly) in neoliberal terms.  For them, 
the EU represented not greater market integration and the elimination of barriers to free 
ƚƌĂĚĞĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĐŬŽŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĂƉƉƌŽchement with the 
ŝĚĞĂ ŽĨ ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ďƵƚ Ă ŵŽƵŶƚĂŝŶŽĨ  ‘ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ƌĞĚ ƚĂƉĞ ? ? ƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŽǀĞƌ-burdensome 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƚŚĞ ĐĂƌƌŝĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƌ ŽĨ ĂŶ ŝůůŝďĞƌĂů  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ŵŽĚĞů ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝƵŵƉŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
 ‘ƐƵƉĞƌ-ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?  /ƚ ǁĂƐ Ă ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĚŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĂŶ ŝŵƉĞĚŝŵĞŶƚ ? in other words, to 
neoliberalisation.  The irony, of course, and the associated paradox is that this is not really the 
Brexit of the May government  W which has tended to resolve the ambiguity in the meaning of 
Brexit in favour of the unofficial Brexit campaign, thereby privileging a neo-conservative 
rather than a neoliberal objection to the EU.  Like many of the targets of the new right in the 
1980s, the EU appears in the cross-wires of both neoliberals and neo-conservatives and the 
campaign for Brexit was led by both.  This has left a significant interpretive ambiguity around 
the meaning of Brexit  W does honouring Brexit involve pandering to sovereigntist, neo-
conservative, anti-immigration sentiment or to a neoliberal deregulatory disposition?  The 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĞĐŽŶŽŵǇŽĨƌĞƐŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚǇŽŶĞǁĂǇŽƌ
the other could scarcely be more different.  But, as yet, we have no significant clarification of 
the extent to which populist impulses and neo-conservative reflexes will be allowed to trump 
neoliberal economic expediency.   
 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉĂƌĂĚŽǆƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌĞǆŝƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂl 
economic interdependence.  On the face of it, and intuitively, Brexit might be imagined to 
unleash a series of de-Europeanisation tendencies.  All things being equal it should suppress 
the ratio of intra-regional to inter-regional cross-border economic transactions involving 
Britain after 40 years in which the figure has grown steadily and consistently and 10 years of 
modest decline.  As such, Brexit might be expected to lead to a de-regionalisation and hence 
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?But all things are not equal 
 W and things are more complicated than this implies (see also Siles-Brugge 2019).  For, in the 
short to medium-terms at least, ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚƌĂĚĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇ
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to suffer from Brexit just as much, if not more, as those with the EU27.  For it was, of course, 
primarily through its EU membership that Britain came to enjoy its privileged access to non-
EU markets.  Thus, whether Brexit leads to a net-globalisation or a net-regionalisation of the 
British economy remains to be seen (and will be contingent upon negotiations that have really 
yet to begin in earnest).  It is also likely to vary over time.  Paradoxically and somewhat 
ironically, the short-ƚĞƌŵĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨƌĞǆŝƚŵĂǇǁĞůůďĞƚŽĚĞĞƉĞŶƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞŐional economic 
interdependence, reversing the recent trend.   
 
What is rather clearer is that Brexit is likely to lead, at least in the medium-term, to a yet more 
swinging and brutal form of austerity, even if its short term effects are to postpone the point 
at which deficit reduction becomes debt reduction.  For it can only suppress the growth 
potential (relative to pre-Brexit trends) of the British economy and that can only serve to 
escalate the costs of (pre-existing commitment to) austerity and to reinfŽƌĐĞƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ
on private, asset-based, welfare rather than public welfare (Farnsworth 2017; Hay 2013).  The 
macroeconomically destabilising and pro-cyclical character of that reliance suggest the longer-
term dangers of such a dependence.   
 
This brings us to two final and rather different paradoxes.  The first is that the revenge of the 
sovereign state  W the victory of the nation-state over the member state as Chris Bickerton 
(2013) might put it  W threatens the fragmentation and dis-memberment of the British state 
itself.  For it is not clear that the increasingly fractious alliance of Great Britain, yet alone the 
increasingly anachronistically entitled United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
can endure the combined political and economic trauma of Brexit (McHarg & Mitchell 2017; 
Wincott 2018).12  Time will tell. 
                                                 
12 There is, of course, a certain irony here.  For Brexit comes after two decades of major constitutional-
territorial change.  This has arguably contributed significantly to the dis-unification and, in a sense, the 
re-nationalisation of the constituent political cultures of the once United Kingdom.  It is powerfully 
present in the very different levels of support for, and resulting politics of, Brexit in England, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.  And it now poses a Brexistential challenge.  For Brexit itself can hardly 
fail to further widen these already deep political-cultural fissures (see particularly Hendersen et al. 
2016; 2017; Wincott 2018).  
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&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĚƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŵŽƐƚƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŝĐĂůůǇŽĨĂůů ?ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
(insofar as that is deemed an appropriate characterisation of at least some of the support for 
ƌĞǆŝƚ ?ŝƐ ?ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶĂƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ
growth model at precisely the moment it becomes more exposed than at any point in the last 
50 years to the rigours of a more genuinely global competition for market share.  It seems, in 
ŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞǆŝƚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ůĞĨƚďĞŚŝŶĚ ?ŽĨŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞ
to reject neoliberal globalisation in favour of a yet more intense version of the same (Baker & 
Lavery 2018; Perraton & Spreafico 2019).  That is some paradox and it is difficult to see it 
ending well. 
 
Conclusion 
 
That this is so is, of course, a consequence of the fact that Brexit is, like Thatcherism before it, 
a product of the complex interplay of neoliberaling and counter-liberalising tendencies and 
counter-tendencies and a combination of neoliberal and neo-conservative reflexes.  Put like 
that, it is hardly surprising that its effects are likely to prove both neoliberalising and counter-
neoliberalising.   
 
Each of these paradoxes and the contradictions and tensions, tendencies and counter-
tendencies from which they arise are already present and visible in the vote for Brexit and the 
ensuing politics of translation which is now in play.  That translation process needs to find a 
way of turning a panoply of multiple imagined Brexits into one substantive Brexit  W and it 
needs to do so through a process that is both bilateral and multilateral.  In and through this 
negotiated process and its interaction with the domestically-engendered paradoxes identified 
above, Brexit will become the thing that (ŝŶ ,ŽďƐďĂǁŵ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌŵƐ) it was always going to 
become.  At that point things will have turned out the way they did (for good or ill) and we 
will see that they could not have turned out any other way.  Without the foresight of a 
predictive science of politics and in the absence of a time-travel machine, the anticipation is 
already unbearable.   
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